Chuck Klosterman Asked a Provocative Question About the Media
Does reading more news make you less informed about the public?
When I set off for Thanksgiving break, Subscriber Teutonia World gave me quite a prompt:
Thankful for the StraussGlass deep dive into the Simmons/Klosterman pod that is obviously coming soon.
That would be an ambitious feat considering the podcast is over two hours and, yes, is an especially free flowing conversation. Instead I’ll drill down on The Election Section because, even though it’s from a couple weeks ago, I found it to be a) wholly unique in the media space and b) Still pertinent to broader media trends.
Lucky for me, Subscriber Nathan asked about that exact section (which kicks off around the 32:40 second mark).
Ethan,
I finally had a chance to listen to the pod this morning and came up with the following questions. It’s a bit stream of consciousness, but I hope it helps you with some prompts if you are interested in continuing writing on this epic podcast episode. Chuck says that the more information he takes in, the less he understands the world. “I’m not even close to what’s happening.”
Every poll, every betting market was very clear. This was going to be a close election, a coin flip between Trump or Harris. CK and Bill act as if this was as unlikely as the Death Star being blown up in episode four. How are they so wrong in their expectations, why are they so surprised?
When you listen to their discussion, I’m confused whether CK is being self deprecating, truly honest or trying to find an excuse to justify why he was so wrong. I get the impression he felt that the media betrayed him, but why rely on one poll in Iowa to justify your entire thinking? Why not pay attention to every article that was saying this is a coin flip? Why not pay attention to trends over the past multiple elections where Republicans have generally over performed polls? Why not question the narrative that a few outlets used to suggest that the Iowa poll would mean a Harris mandate? He just accepts the premise, which seems like a very non-CK thing to do.
If CK is so off when it comes to understanding 2024 does this undermine his status as an expert of the 90s or other parts of his past work as a social critic? If he’s so far off on this election, why should I respect his opinion about Nirvana’s influence on pop culture or Bill Clinton’s election in 1992?
Much like CK is questioning everything that he knows in the world I’m questioning why anyone would listen to him or BS for that reason.
Thanks for your time. I’ll take the answers off the air.
-Nathan
Okay, there’s a lot here, and I have a slightly different perspective on much of this. First off, I respected and appreciated the epistemic humility on display in the pod. Nobody forced Klosterman to admit his incorrect expectation. He divulged that on his own accord, to set up a broader admission of uncertainty. Public facing people usually feel pressure to act more savvy than the consumer, not less. I believe Klosterman’s confession and subsequent grappling were wholly authentic.
When you listen to their discussion, I’m confused whether CK is being self deprecating, truly honest or trying to find an excuse to justify why he was so wrong.
I do not know Chuck, beyond the two times he appeared on my podcast, but I found him to be so intensely earnest that I struggled to properly mesh at first. I just can’t imagine him being self-deprecating for the sake of endearing himself to others and I mean that as a high compliment.
Even though I felt like the 2024 election result was as expected, mostly thanks to my weird obsession with early voting trends, I always carried a bit of doubt over what the data was shouting. You just can never really know-know until the result is rendered. In 2022, I was certainly surprised by the Dem overperformance. That result led me to feel a bit like Chuck: Wondering about what I’d missed, questioning if I had a good read on the broader culture.
But let’s set that aside, because really, who cares? The ability to predict one massive high leverage event isn’t a referendum on someone’s entire ability to perceive social trends. More to the point, nobody listens to me, Klosterman, or Bill Simmons for election predictions.
If CK is so off when it comes to understanding 2024 does this undermine his status as an expert of the 90s or other parts of his past work as a social critic?
I would argue that relative political disengagement makes Chuck Klosterman the ideal chronicler of the 1990’s. Like many a Gen Xer, Klosterman isn’t inordinantly obsessed with politics. He’s even made the point, to the chagrin of highly engaged journo lefties, that the 1990’s weren’t an especially political time. Chuck caught a lot of flak for saying so, but the facts were on his side. Voter participation reached historic lows in that era, and, subjectively, being politically apathetic was regarded as higher status. To truly see the 1990s, I believe it helps to have some political detachment, even when discussing the decade’s politics.
There’s a great section in Klosterman’s book where he’s looking back on Ross Perot’s rise with intense curiosity. If a political pundit were charged with writing that chapter, the content might be too infused with themes related to modern Trumpism. Instead, Chuck just regards Perot on his own terms, interpreted exactly as he appeared to resonate in that particular era. And I believe this is where Klosterman excels: Looking back, with passionate dispassion. You don’t need a bead on what’s coming next to be great at that sort of work.
But let’s get to Klosterman’s main question in the podcast: Were the most avid news consumers ironically the most misinformed about the national mood? I think this is a pretty plausible equation, at least within the cohort of Chuck’s (I’m guessing) affluent liberal social circle. My overtly political lefty friends were on the lookout for data points that made them feel better. Much of the media felt similarly, plus there was a benefit to serving predictions that soothed this cohort.
Nobody is immune to this kind of confirmation bias, on either side. The reason it’s notable in this instance, and Klosterman comes right up to the line without making the case, is that the legacy media, post Trump, is so wholly wedded to one team. In the past, much of the media was liberal, but there was more ideological diversity within it. Also, there was more of a professional commitment to objective truth versus “moral clarity.”
I’m generalizing here, but…much of the name brand media apparatus channels fan fiction these days. That structure has been hollowed out, mostly by technological factors, and it has gotten loudly strident almost to compensate for weakness. While the relevance of network news, NPR and major newspapers is greatly waning, it still retains some cachet with highly educated people over age 40.
This cohort, including and especially the boomer liberal archetype (again, generalizing!), sometimes doesn’t know what it doesn’t know. The people who were raised on newspapers hail from an era where one could plausibly believe themselves informed based on these higher quality products. Over time, the eroding presence of “news” got spackled over with ideological reaffirmation, but a lot of consumers still believe that “news” consumption does the trick of elevating them above their peers. They are woefully misinformed here (The science is conclusive that subscribing to House of Strauss elevates you above your peers).
There are similar dynamics on the other side, but the other side just isn’t as well positioned among, for lack of a better term, elites. Perhaps this is all changing now that Elon Musk runs Twitter/X, but that’s a different topic for a different day. My bigger point is that legacy news isn’t failing the intensely ideological customer, though the effects aren’t great. That consumer is looking for and receiving an emotionally cathartic product. Instead, legacy news is failing a guy like Chuck Klosterman: Smart, well read, (likely) liberal, but not politically obsessed.
A well functioning mainstream news system should keep a guy like Chuck reliably informed about the national mood. You shouldn’t have to listen to three hour Joe Rogan podcasts to get a sense of what the American mainstream might plausibly be. The New York Times and the New Yorker should be fairly presenting the other side’s views, in the way that side actually conceives of their own views.
Instead, we’ve lived through a bizarre epoch where the “mainstream” aggressively played defense against acknowledging the mainstream. Donald Trump has been central to this crackup. So many people in media were, for reasons I get, invested in Trump never becoming “normalized.” But it happened, whether brand name outlets wanted to admit it or not.
In the aforementioned podcast, Klosterman posits that perhaps any basic Republican stand in, such as Nikki Haley, could have won, given what happened. Maybe, but I doubt it. A difficult conclusion for a lot of media consumers to grapple with is just that Donald Trump is fairly popular. Not necessarily Obama 2008 popular, or even Obama 2012 popular, but he ran ahead of his party. The rural areas went crazy for Trump, and his brand markedly outperformed Republicans down ballot in minority-heavy urban areas. Nikki Haley isn’t pulling that off. Nikki Haley ain’t got no merch.
It was taboo to notice Trump’s growing popularity in spaces where acknowledgement could get attacked as endorsement. Ever since 2016, legacy media gatekeepers have been haunted by the idea that they might help Trump happen. Turns out he happened anyway, and as he did, they squandered credibility with engaged and apathetic consumers alike.
The results of this election have been overdetermined to the point of absurdity.
In 2004, W's approval rating the week of the election was 51%. He got 50.7% of the vote.
In 2012, Obama's approval rating the week of the election was 50.5%. He got 51.1% of the vote.
In 2020, Trump's approval rating the week of the election was 46%. He got 46.8% of the vote.
In 2024, Biden's approval rating was 41% the week of the election. Kamala got 47% of the vote.
Now, I assume if the first debate had not been televised, in which it was made clear to the country that Joe Biden was suffering from dementia, his approval rating would have been higher, perhaps 43-44%. But Donald Trump won because there are two choices in every American election, and the American people think the current president is doing a bad job. It doesn't have a ton to do with toxic masculinity, or podcasts, or Hollywood, or intersectionality, or ignoring January 6th. There are two choices and the American people chose "the other guy" as opposed to "reupping with the current guy". (There is a universe where Kamala Harris could have aggressively contrasted herself with Joe Biden and shit all over his policies and said she was going to do things very differently, and perhaps that would have worked--or failed miserably--but we do not live in that universe, plain and simple.)
Why do Americans think Joe Biden is doing such a terrible job? There are roughly 38 political issues on the table at any time, but two of them hold 95% of the public bandwidth: the economy and (national) security. People have opinions and preferences about every issue, but they mostly care about feeling safe and being able to feed their families. Joe Biden presided over the largest hike in inflation in forty years, and on the security front, he was at the helm during a three-part "security" disaster: 7.5 million new illegal immigrants entering the country, with no end in sight; an enormous 2020 crime wave that still leaves murder rates 20% higher than their 2019 low (and everything at CVS locked up); and a wave of pro-Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthi/Iran protests that left bridges blocked, hospitals inaccessible, flags burned, Death to America chanted, janitors at elite universities assaulted, and a constant barrage of slogans and placards promoting what are officially designated as terrorist groups by the United States government.
There are lots of ways of processing that information with data that minimize the effect of everything I've just said, and most of those counterarguments are straightforwardly factual. Inflation has declined significantly since its 2022 high; as has crime from its 2020 high; no one has been killed in any of the student protests, and most of the students are not demonstrably anti-semitic, or even anti-American. What Chuck is noticing is that media junkies inhale the aforementioned set of stats, since many members of the media have made it their personal raison d'être to use facts and numbers to defend the Democratic Party, as if it was facing death row and they were its last chance at a fair trial. And the junkies down that information like a life raft in a hale storm, as if there is some supervenient set of facts that all voters are compelled to respond to, as opposed to these factoids serving as competing set of numbers which fly around like betting lines on DraftKings. (My favorite version of this tendency was during Trump Era I, when on a nightly basis, Rachel Maddow would uncover some evidence of Trump's corruption or misgivings and triumphantly shout, "We got him!", as if Trump was going to instantly leave office simply because Rachel Maddow herself had discovered that the president had once done something wrong.)
As Lee Atwater said, "in politics, the truth is what the voters believe", and the impression the Biden administration gave, in part caused by his senility, was not just that they were okay with all the chaos and decay they were engendering, but that they were powerless to do anything about it. That higher crime rates and unfettered illegal immigration and runaway inflation were just a naturally occurring part of the declining empire we live in, and trying to stop them was like trying to stop the sun from shining. People joke that the left-wing response to cancel culture is, "It's not happening and it's good that it is"; well their response to government incompetence seems to be "it's not happening and well, it is but we can't even do anything about it so shut up". And to this, Trump says no. He has a vision--or at least a plan; or maybe concepts of a plan--to restore America to its 1990s apogee of a soaring economy, tasteful nudity, moderate tolerance for racism, open and free usage of the phrase "Merry Christmas", crime declines, fewer mixed-race couples in ads for paper towels, and violent and masculine movies. Some of his ideas are illiberal, almost all of them are illegal, and perhaps one or two of them will come to pass. But the Democrats have little left to fight back with. Once the party of making the world a better place--which meant a bigger and better government--it has transformed into the party of the right side of history, which, as far as anyone can tell means a barrage of name-calling and exclusion if you disagree with their preferences, even if they have lead to the dysfunctional results so many Americans are currently unhappy with. The Democrats have transformed from a party of Leslie Knopes to a party of Regina Georges, and the Republicans have remained the party of Al Bundy, feckless, reactionary, and retrograde, but with a core that at least remains impervious to fashion. At least he'll let you sit with us.
Marc Andreessen RTing this article and revealing himself as House of Straussian is big news!