This is half baked analysis that doesn't remotely tell us what it thinks it does. What is the distance to go on the 4th down passes Goff had last year? How does it shake out by game situation (have to go for it on 4th down on a last drive in negative territory compared to a 1st-3rd quarter drive in positive territory)? How does Goff's conversion rate on 4th down passes compare to the league? How does it compare to Plan A qbs vs Plan A, B, and C qbs? This is before you even get to any analysis of what happened on the 4th down plays in question. For example, the first 4th down the Lions missed in the 3rd was much more due to a dropped pass than anything Goff did. How did the rest of his 4th down passes throughout the year shake out? And don't even get me started on "62.6% completion percentage is subpar" being any sort of real analysis. Completion percentage, unless truly horrible, which that number is not, is more a function of the offensive system than anything else. Stafford being top 10 in yards/attempt, yards/completion, adjusted yards/pass attempt, net yards/pass attempt, and adjusted net yards/pass attempt all indicate he was operating the Rams pass offense at an efficient clip. Not to mention this is evident when you watch the tape as well.
did the Chiefs do this the whole game? was Lamar making the wrong reads or did KC's D play the game of their life? (or similarly were they just a very talented defense). did other teams try to employ this strategy during the regular season, and if so, what were the results? Did Jackson actually "turn down TDs", as stated, or were they not there?
All completely valid questions that are were never explored by Ethan. Which I get, they would require both film study of the game and a solid understanding of the Chiefs tactics, the Ravens scheme, and the reads. Not something Ethan has the time (duh) or, from my reading of his football articles, the understanding to do. Which is no issue, he's not a footbal guy, but some understanding of those limitations would be nice to see conveyed in the writing.
From watching the game (TV feed only, no all-22) and now 7 months later recollection, the Chiefs used their super complicated blitz package to run both cover 0, 5 man blitzes with cover 2, and sim pressures to slow down Lamar's ability to diagnose what was happening. That is one of his weaknesses. He missed some things, partially due to the Chiefs great design, and the Chiefs, who were one of the best, if not the best, pass defenses all season played great. Both their DC and their pass defense (scheme, coverage, players) were/are elite. Teams have employed similar tactics as the Chiefs in the past, namely the cover 0 stuff, or bluff all out blitz with multiple spies, and it has slowed Lamar down (see diagnosis comment above). He's gotten better and their new OC has seemed to have a better plan to attack those tactics, but it's still not a strong point of his and theirs. Lastly, I wouldn't say Lamar "turned down TDs", we really don't know enough to make that claim, but he definitely wasn't sharp on his reads. It was a mid game for him. The Ravens, in my opinion, had a bad game plan as well. A group effort on being mid.
All that said, Ethan hasn't demonstrated the ability to make that analysis beyond "look at the offensive output, look at the yards, Lamar played bad", which isn't analysis so much as box score looking. His scheme knowledge is limited to basic and thus doesn't allow him to actually make an argument from that angle. Which, again, is fine since he isn't a football guy. Which makes it weird to venture into that lane in an authoritative tone.
The best quarterbacks are those that i) can read defenses well; ii) can predict the flow of a play after the snap; and iii) have enough tools to exploit i and ii (not actually a high bar—see late career Brees/Brady/etc…).
The running/non running distinction is usually a red herring. A good read will almost always include a pass, it is rarely run only. Jared Goff and Lamar Jackson are more similar than they are different because they are mediocre at i) and ii).
I think Ethan is in the uncanny valley on football. Doesn't know enough to do thorough analysis. Knows too much to approach from an exploratory "what is this all about" perspective.
Ethan, you clearly have had a surge in interest for the Niners/NFL over the last ~2-3 years. And having a one off article about the topic is something I can just couch as scratching your football itch much like having a beer with a friend who is really into the Austrian-Hungarian political relationships or something obscure like that. I can stomach some conversation around a topic I have no care about as long as there's other substance in the conversation that I can enjoy.
I don't give a fuck about your basic statistical analysis of 4th down performance for a quarterback much like I don't want to listen to James Dolan play the kazoo. I doubt I'm the only one. And I'm letting you know this because I think you have entirely way too much creep on a topic that I don't think your readership cares about. Maybe I'm wrong and these articles do gangbusters to temper potential churn, but at least you have one data point from your readership that this topic isn't interesting.
I think this analysis should show how Goff compares to his peers on 4th down.
40% seems like a bad conversion rate, and Ethan concedes that QBs generally do worse on 4th down than 1st down, but why?
A couple reasons, I can think of off the top of my head:
1. Team typically go for it on 4th down when they are around midfield. Not so far back in their own zone that they would essentially be conceding points to the other team if they fail, but not in easy field goal range themselves. What Gregg Easterbrook used to call the "maroon zone" or something similar. And there they have a little less field to work with.
2. Some of those passes would come in 4th and long situations where the run is not a realistic option and the defense can key on the pass.
3. Some of those 4th downs are in desperate last second situations like the last minute of a game when they're behind by multiple scores and are going for more yards.
4. The defense is more locked in on 4th down.
---
Do these factors turn 40% into an acceptable percentage? I don't know without seeing how other QBs prefer. Ethan offers a reasonable story about why Goff might not be effective here, but I think we need to see how others do to be sure.
This is a great breakdown. Have to say - even before reading it - Goff doesn't pass the sight test - or the "believe in him" test. I was a long-time basketball coach - before the analytics craze - and guys like Chris Paul and Russell Westbrook never passed the "crunch time test" - with other coaches I'd discuss their play with. Low and behold - analytics went on to show that in crunch time - final three minutes in playoff games - that C Paul and Russell Westbrook - even in their primes - were bottom 3rd point guards.
Goff has always "felt" and looked that way - and the numbers you posted scream out loud, what was previously a quiet thought.
I think a thorough analysis on this topic should sufficiently define what 4th down success is. If punting is not a negative outcome, and one of the claims is that punting is a planned interception, then is an unplanned interception on 4th down? really all that bad? The same could possibly be argued for an incomplete pass on 4th cuz it's a change of possession anyway.
Clearly, the goal is a first down. But the measure of failure/success is maybe not the same as on other downs, and is certainly not the same as failure/success in a broader sense.
I am a Lions fan so clearly biased, but felt like looking into it a little bit. There's probably way more information I am missing, but I can at least pull some stuff from footballdb.com. Couldn't find game timing or point differential etc..
But here's at least a little bit deeper digging.
4th and 1-3, Goff was 9/13 with 1 INT and 1 TD. He was also 1/1 on rushes for a First down.
4th and 4-7, Goff was 2/8.
4th 8-10, Goff was 0/4. with 1 INT
4th and 11+, Goff was 0/2 with 1 INT.
Each pass completed was a First Down.
Just for Comparison, I looked up Jordan Love. Not similar players at all, but I was curious since he can move pretty good.
4th and 1-3, Love was 8/12 with 7 First downs and 3 TD's. He was 2/2 on rushes for FD's.
4th and 4-7, Love was 1/2 with 1 FD.
4th and 8-10, Love was 1/2 with 1 FD.
4th and 11+, Love was 0/1. He had 1 rush for 15 yards but didn't get a first down.
They seem, similar? With the Lions going for it way more often on tougher situational downs and Goff sucking on those, though raw data doesn't tell you about drops and whatever other things may not have been on him. The Lions didn't trust their kicker and have a shitty defense, so it makes sense they are going for it more in those tougher spots. You want a better conversion rate though, definitely. Like, just one would be great.
Since, I'm already doing this, I am going to look up Mahomes.
4th and 1-3. Mahomes was 3/4 with 3 FD's. 3 rushes for 12 yards and 3 FD's.
4th and 4-7, Mahomes was 0/2
4th and 8-10, Mahomes was 0/1. 1 rush for -2 yards.
4th and 11+, Mahomes was 0/4
Goff 4th down conversion rate: 12/28(42%)
Love 4th down conversion rate: 12/20(60%)
Mahomes 4th down conversion rate: 6/15(40%)
This is in no way saying that Love or Goff are better than Mahomes, situation matters so much in this kind of stuff and I feel like it was ignored pretty significantly by Ethan. Goff isn't the best QB in the NFL, Goff probably isn't a top 8 QB in the NFL but acting as if he was holding them back feels incorrect? He did an awesome job with the offense and put up similar stats to Mahomes on 4th downs despite bad situations.
Hey, I am stupid, someone smart may explain why the numbers I see are totally irrelevant too who knows.
Yup ditto. 4th downs can be categorized as (1) favorable, short yardage or (2) desperation attempts at end of games. Those falling in (2) are more likely to be 4th and long anyway and Ethan only seems interested in (1) but includes (2). The small sample size leads to a lot of noise in the results as well. Showing the plays and how Goff makes mistakes or the defenses job easier is probably more appropriate given the sample rather than pointing to stats unless broaden the sample to three groups: statue QBs, athletic QBs, and running QBs.
That said, I think that Ethan’s conclusion regarding a baseline level of mobility is correct with practice rule changes of 2011 and scheme changes. Quarterbacks have less practice time to develop and prospects are both started and benched earlier so without a baseline level of athleticism it’s tougher for QBs to stay on the field long enough to truly develop. A parallel to this is that old pitchers are still quite good (Greinke, Verlander, Kershaw, Scherzer, Randy Johnson, Maddux) with diminished stuff because the natural ability they had gave them a decade plus of opportunities to learn the finer points of the position.
This is half baked analysis that doesn't remotely tell us what it thinks it does. What is the distance to go on the 4th down passes Goff had last year? How does it shake out by game situation (have to go for it on 4th down on a last drive in negative territory compared to a 1st-3rd quarter drive in positive territory)? How does Goff's conversion rate on 4th down passes compare to the league? How does it compare to Plan A qbs vs Plan A, B, and C qbs? This is before you even get to any analysis of what happened on the 4th down plays in question. For example, the first 4th down the Lions missed in the 3rd was much more due to a dropped pass than anything Goff did. How did the rest of his 4th down passes throughout the year shake out? And don't even get me started on "62.6% completion percentage is subpar" being any sort of real analysis. Completion percentage, unless truly horrible, which that number is not, is more a function of the offensive system than anything else. Stafford being top 10 in yards/attempt, yards/completion, adjusted yards/pass attempt, net yards/pass attempt, and adjusted net yards/pass attempt all indicate he was operating the Rams pass offense at an efficient clip. Not to mention this is evident when you watch the tape as well.
also re: Lamar:
did the Chiefs do this the whole game? was Lamar making the wrong reads or did KC's D play the game of their life? (or similarly were they just a very talented defense). did other teams try to employ this strategy during the regular season, and if so, what were the results? Did Jackson actually "turn down TDs", as stated, or were they not there?
All completely valid questions that are were never explored by Ethan. Which I get, they would require both film study of the game and a solid understanding of the Chiefs tactics, the Ravens scheme, and the reads. Not something Ethan has the time (duh) or, from my reading of his football articles, the understanding to do. Which is no issue, he's not a footbal guy, but some understanding of those limitations would be nice to see conveyed in the writing.
From watching the game (TV feed only, no all-22) and now 7 months later recollection, the Chiefs used their super complicated blitz package to run both cover 0, 5 man blitzes with cover 2, and sim pressures to slow down Lamar's ability to diagnose what was happening. That is one of his weaknesses. He missed some things, partially due to the Chiefs great design, and the Chiefs, who were one of the best, if not the best, pass defenses all season played great. Both their DC and their pass defense (scheme, coverage, players) were/are elite. Teams have employed similar tactics as the Chiefs in the past, namely the cover 0 stuff, or bluff all out blitz with multiple spies, and it has slowed Lamar down (see diagnosis comment above). He's gotten better and their new OC has seemed to have a better plan to attack those tactics, but it's still not a strong point of his and theirs. Lastly, I wouldn't say Lamar "turned down TDs", we really don't know enough to make that claim, but he definitely wasn't sharp on his reads. It was a mid game for him. The Ravens, in my opinion, had a bad game plan as well. A group effort on being mid.
All that said, Ethan hasn't demonstrated the ability to make that analysis beyond "look at the offensive output, look at the yards, Lamar played bad", which isn't analysis so much as box score looking. His scheme knowledge is limited to basic and thus doesn't allow him to actually make an argument from that angle. Which, again, is fine since he isn't a football guy. Which makes it weird to venture into that lane in an authoritative tone.
Thanks for all the insight! also yea i think its the tone that bothers me about this
The best quarterbacks are those that i) can read defenses well; ii) can predict the flow of a play after the snap; and iii) have enough tools to exploit i and ii (not actually a high bar—see late career Brees/Brady/etc…).
The running/non running distinction is usually a red herring. A good read will almost always include a pass, it is rarely run only. Jared Goff and Lamar Jackson are more similar than they are different because they are mediocre at i) and ii).
I think Ethan is in the uncanny valley on football. Doesn't know enough to do thorough analysis. Knows too much to approach from an exploratory "what is this all about" perspective.
Could be true but…got similar pushback from the commenters after calling the Eagles collapse (before the rest of the media did) last season!
Ethan, you clearly have had a surge in interest for the Niners/NFL over the last ~2-3 years. And having a one off article about the topic is something I can just couch as scratching your football itch much like having a beer with a friend who is really into the Austrian-Hungarian political relationships or something obscure like that. I can stomach some conversation around a topic I have no care about as long as there's other substance in the conversation that I can enjoy.
I don't give a fuck about your basic statistical analysis of 4th down performance for a quarterback much like I don't want to listen to James Dolan play the kazoo. I doubt I'm the only one. And I'm letting you know this because I think you have entirely way too much creep on a topic that I don't think your readership cares about. Maybe I'm wrong and these articles do gangbusters to temper potential churn, but at least you have one data point from your readership that this topic isn't interesting.
I think this analysis should show how Goff compares to his peers on 4th down.
40% seems like a bad conversion rate, and Ethan concedes that QBs generally do worse on 4th down than 1st down, but why?
A couple reasons, I can think of off the top of my head:
1. Team typically go for it on 4th down when they are around midfield. Not so far back in their own zone that they would essentially be conceding points to the other team if they fail, but not in easy field goal range themselves. What Gregg Easterbrook used to call the "maroon zone" or something similar. And there they have a little less field to work with.
2. Some of those passes would come in 4th and long situations where the run is not a realistic option and the defense can key on the pass.
3. Some of those 4th downs are in desperate last second situations like the last minute of a game when they're behind by multiple scores and are going for more yards.
4. The defense is more locked in on 4th down.
---
Do these factors turn 40% into an acceptable percentage? I don't know without seeing how other QBs prefer. Ethan offers a reasonable story about why Goff might not be effective here, but I think we need to see how others do to be sure.
Goff level article. Good but not great.
Great one!
This is a great breakdown. Have to say - even before reading it - Goff doesn't pass the sight test - or the "believe in him" test. I was a long-time basketball coach - before the analytics craze - and guys like Chris Paul and Russell Westbrook never passed the "crunch time test" - with other coaches I'd discuss their play with. Low and behold - analytics went on to show that in crunch time - final three minutes in playoff games - that C Paul and Russell Westbrook - even in their primes - were bottom 3rd point guards.
Goff has always "felt" and looked that way - and the numbers you posted scream out loud, what was previously a quiet thought.
I think a thorough analysis on this topic should sufficiently define what 4th down success is. If punting is not a negative outcome, and one of the claims is that punting is a planned interception, then is an unplanned interception on 4th down? really all that bad? The same could possibly be argued for an incomplete pass on 4th cuz it's a change of possession anyway.
Clearly, the goal is a first down. But the measure of failure/success is maybe not the same as on other downs, and is certainly not the same as failure/success in a broader sense.
Why does no one look at Campbell's decision making on the first three downs? How conservative is he on 1st? 2nd and long?
I am a Lions fan so clearly biased, but felt like looking into it a little bit. There's probably way more information I am missing, but I can at least pull some stuff from footballdb.com. Couldn't find game timing or point differential etc..
But here's at least a little bit deeper digging.
4th and 1-3, Goff was 9/13 with 1 INT and 1 TD. He was also 1/1 on rushes for a First down.
4th and 4-7, Goff was 2/8.
4th 8-10, Goff was 0/4. with 1 INT
4th and 11+, Goff was 0/2 with 1 INT.
Each pass completed was a First Down.
Just for Comparison, I looked up Jordan Love. Not similar players at all, but I was curious since he can move pretty good.
4th and 1-3, Love was 8/12 with 7 First downs and 3 TD's. He was 2/2 on rushes for FD's.
4th and 4-7, Love was 1/2 with 1 FD.
4th and 8-10, Love was 1/2 with 1 FD.
4th and 11+, Love was 0/1. He had 1 rush for 15 yards but didn't get a first down.
They seem, similar? With the Lions going for it way more often on tougher situational downs and Goff sucking on those, though raw data doesn't tell you about drops and whatever other things may not have been on him. The Lions didn't trust their kicker and have a shitty defense, so it makes sense they are going for it more in those tougher spots. You want a better conversion rate though, definitely. Like, just one would be great.
Since, I'm already doing this, I am going to look up Mahomes.
4th and 1-3. Mahomes was 3/4 with 3 FD's. 3 rushes for 12 yards and 3 FD's.
4th and 4-7, Mahomes was 0/2
4th and 8-10, Mahomes was 0/1. 1 rush for -2 yards.
4th and 11+, Mahomes was 0/4
Goff 4th down conversion rate: 12/28(42%)
Love 4th down conversion rate: 12/20(60%)
Mahomes 4th down conversion rate: 6/15(40%)
This is in no way saying that Love or Goff are better than Mahomes, situation matters so much in this kind of stuff and I feel like it was ignored pretty significantly by Ethan. Goff isn't the best QB in the NFL, Goff probably isn't a top 8 QB in the NFL but acting as if he was holding them back feels incorrect? He did an awesome job with the offense and put up similar stats to Mahomes on 4th downs despite bad situations.
Hey, I am stupid, someone smart may explain why the numbers I see are totally irrelevant too who knows.
Appreciate the deeper dive. From last post-season, looks like Goff threw a couple more touchdowns.
vs. Rams: 4th and 1 from the 2 - TD Pass to LaPorta
@ 49ers: 4th and goal from the 3 - TD Pass to Williams
Clicking around that site, also appears the 49ers barely ever put the ball in Purdy's hands on a 4th down.
Yup ditto. 4th downs can be categorized as (1) favorable, short yardage or (2) desperation attempts at end of games. Those falling in (2) are more likely to be 4th and long anyway and Ethan only seems interested in (1) but includes (2). The small sample size leads to a lot of noise in the results as well. Showing the plays and how Goff makes mistakes or the defenses job easier is probably more appropriate given the sample rather than pointing to stats unless broaden the sample to three groups: statue QBs, athletic QBs, and running QBs.
That said, I think that Ethan’s conclusion regarding a baseline level of mobility is correct with practice rule changes of 2011 and scheme changes. Quarterbacks have less practice time to develop and prospects are both started and benched earlier so without a baseline level of athleticism it’s tougher for QBs to stay on the field long enough to truly develop. A parallel to this is that old pitchers are still quite good (Greinke, Verlander, Kershaw, Scherzer, Randy Johnson, Maddux) with diminished stuff because the natural ability they had gave them a decade plus of opportunities to learn the finer points of the position.