NFL Training Camp has started, which has kicked off a slew of quarterback rankings. I have many thoughts on quarterbacks, including my New Rule of QB Overrating:
The overrated quarterbacks are guys who either run a lot, or don’t run at all.
I just think it’s optimal for a QB to be like Patrick Mahomes (in general), but especially on a crucial fourth or third down: Mahomes is always looking to pass, but if the defense turns its back, he’ll scoot for the easy conversion when it really matters.
Mahomes and other guys who run at a similar rate have achieved a proper balance. Running is for when you absolutely need it, and when you need it, it works. A higher volume rushing quarterback can raise a team’s regular season floor, but can also encounter the obvious problem of injury risk, plus become over reliant on the run. For example, Lamar Jackson in last season’s AFC Championship game between the Chiefs and Ravens:
I think the correct takeaway from that game is that Spagnuolo dared Jackson to make basic pro level throws and Lamar couldn’t consistently do it. For example, Spagnuolo used a Cover 0 blitz with two quarterback spies against Jackson. Against an average quarterback, a defense like this means a significant risk of conceding a walk in touchdown. There are no safeties back, and two defenders are up near the line, guarding against a QB scramble, but not pressuring an early throw. Jackson turned down the TD opportunities and got hit while throwing the ball away.
I’m not saying two time MVP Lamar Jackson is bad (though he’s not quite at the level he was in 2019). I am saying that defenses can take advantage of a player’s propensity to run when in doubt.
Similarly, quarterbacks who almost never run are also vulnerable in their own special ways. Like Lamar Jackson, Rams quarterback Matt Stafford is a good player. I’m also not quite sold on where I’m seeing Stafford in some of these rankings because, at age 36, he can’t really move. Stafford’s overall production was good last season but he completed passes at a subpar 62.6 percent rate. I’m guessing the issue wasn’t inaccuracy. I just believe that Stafford understands the ball has to come out or he’s getting hit. There’s no Plan B.
Jared Goff, the man once traded for Stafford to the Detroit Lions, is another Plan A quarterback and the main character in today’s post. Similar to Stafford, he suffers from mobility issues, but I’d argue that Goff, an otherwise decent QB, is more prone to pressured mistakes. With these combined factors, it’s so odd that Goff’s Lions have become the posterboys for 4th down aggression.
4th and Wrong
With new information comes new opinions. I’ve made my way through Receiver on Netflix, flaws and all. The show does a good treatment of the 2023 NFC championship game between the San Francisco 49ers and Detroit Lions, including a spotlight on Lions coach Dan Campbell’s infamously ill fated 4th down boldness. I liked how process oriented Lions star wideout and Receiver featured character Amon Ra St. Brown was about the bad outcome. He expressed that it was what the Lions had done all season, with success, and so he was fine with it.
That’s a good attitude, but had the Lions really succeeded with this strategy? I had simply assumed they had, due to my own bias on the issue. Now, looking back at the entire context, I’m far less certain.
Obviously I watched the 2023 NFC championship. While I was happy with the result, I felt annoyed when the next couple days of sports media reaction were spent mostly on debating the 4th down decisions. I’m generally in favor of going for it, and am impatient for the league to get on board already. It’s bizarre to me that teams punt as often as they do. Aren’t coaches aware that a punt is a lot like a planned interception, only thrown with your foot? So, I appreciated how the Lions had taken up this mantle of being the 4th down team. Boasting a conversion rate of 60 percent, the numbers had also validated the strategy.
But there’s an issue here, something I didn’t notice until recently: The Lions, despite their overall 4th down success, are actually badly positioned to be our 4th down ambassadors. In a high leverage moment, on 4th and long, they are lacking.
I should note that the Lions are well positioned on 4th and short, specifically. They’ve an excellent offensive line and a talented pair of running backs in Jahmyr Gibbs and David Montgomery. If the Lions need a yard, they can get a yard. The problem is fourth and longer, when the team is reliant on Jared Goff for a conversion.
Look, I like Jared Goff (Go Bears). I think this Lions team could win a Super Bowl with him at the helm. But given his limitations, going for it on 4th down is not his strong suit. Perhaps Dan Campbell believes in his guy but I’m less convinced. Here are Goff’s career numbers when passing on 4th down:
39-of-93 (41.94 percent), 505 yards, 8 touchdowns, 7 interceptions, 7 sacks, 37 1st downs
Yikes. Yes, quarterbacks do a bit worse in a 4th down scenario versus a 1st down scenario. No, they don’t typically do that bad. But wait, perhaps Goff does better on 4th when surrounded by this particular Lions roster? Nope, last season he was 11-for-27 (40.7 percent) with 1 touchdown and 3 interceptions. He’s been terrible at this, for reasons that seem pretty intuitive. Under pressure, with jammed receivers, Jared Goff is no threat to take off. Last season the Lions quarterback rushed for a grand total of 21 yards. Some immobile quarterbacks can calmly navigate heavy pressure, but he has not been that guy. This sort of scenario brings out Goff’s vulnerabilities.
Obviously there are still some situations where the Lions should pass on 4th down. I’m just highlighting this issue because I enjoy paradoxes: The most forward thinking team on this analytics issue is held back by a guy they rely on. It’s like if the first NBA team to really max out on 3-pointers didn’t have any good shooters. The Detroit Lions, a worthy Super Bowl contender, are in a tricky spot if they keep leaning on their branded aggression this season. They’ve got the right idea, but appear to have the wrong guy.
This is half baked analysis that doesn't remotely tell us what it thinks it does. What is the distance to go on the 4th down passes Goff had last year? How does it shake out by game situation (have to go for it on 4th down on a last drive in negative territory compared to a 1st-3rd quarter drive in positive territory)? How does Goff's conversion rate on 4th down passes compare to the league? How does it compare to Plan A qbs vs Plan A, B, and C qbs? This is before you even get to any analysis of what happened on the 4th down plays in question. For example, the first 4th down the Lions missed in the 3rd was much more due to a dropped pass than anything Goff did. How did the rest of his 4th down passes throughout the year shake out? And don't even get me started on "62.6% completion percentage is subpar" being any sort of real analysis. Completion percentage, unless truly horrible, which that number is not, is more a function of the offensive system than anything else. Stafford being top 10 in yards/attempt, yards/completion, adjusted yards/pass attempt, net yards/pass attempt, and adjusted net yards/pass attempt all indicate he was operating the Rams pass offense at an efficient clip. Not to mention this is evident when you watch the tape as well.
I have no doubt of Goff's limitations at QB hindering their 4th down ability but this post does nothing to prove that. Interceptions and sacks on 4th down are essentially meaningless, you're already giving up the ball if you don't convert.
Can we at least see what their expected conversion rate was on say 4th and 3+ and then how often they converted?