God I hate these “not gambling, gambling” episodes. The issue with framing sports talk around gambling/odds/etc is that the central character becomes the better, and the action on the field becomes secondary
Enjoyable as always. I do apologize here, but let's take my lengthy reactions in rough order:
(1) With regard to line drive kickoffs (which is presented as an innovative strategy), you cannot focus only on the cherry-picked positive outcomes, whether from YouTube or otherwise, to assess the strategy. You need to look at the net EPA differences from the strategy by also examining when the strategy fails. Otherwise, Russian Roulette would be way more exciting since if you ignore the single bullet in the chamber, the other 5 trigger pulls become a "really exciting" strategy.
This is not a theoretical or humorous exercise. In the Lions/Ravens game less than 24 hours ago, you saw this principle manifested in real time. Ravens’ kicker, Tyler Loop, missed the landing zone on one of his attempted line drive kickoffs...resulting in the Lions getting the ball at the 40 from which they scored a soul crushing - game changing - touchdown. Forget EPA, he arguably cost them the game with this stratagem.
Yet, somehow, it's worse. Loop has now missed the landing zone in each of the Ravens' first three games - a total of 4 misses overall - giving the opponent the ball at the ridiculously advantageous 40-yard line four times. Today in Baltimore, there is talk of benching Loop and his "cutting edge" kickoff strategy. Something tells me that Loop's failures won't make it to the Isaac Punts YouTube channel. Again, tell me the NET outcome of this strategy over time and not just when it works.
(2) FGs are being blocked at a higher rate, because of physics. This is not a new phenomenon, and has always been true. As the average attempted FG distance gets longer in the NFL, the kicker is required to reduce the launch angle (closer to the defensive line) to drive the ball and cover the horizontal distance over the cross bar. This is unlike shorter kicks where the kicker can pop the kick high into the air and over the defensive line. More blocks kicks is the predictable outcome here.
(3) With regard to Ethan's point about whether the Ravens should have gone for it on 4th and 9...while I don't know the answer, his analytical approach is spot on. I've talked about this in a prior post. Algorithms use average League outcome to supposedly "predict" your specific outcome. However, that's often an erroneous approach, sometimes wildly so. See, the middle of the bell curve is often very different than the case in front of you. Averages are interesting to know, but not necessarily predictive of your specific outcome.
Take last night. Harbaugh needed to understand that he is not facing the 16th rated offense with his 16th rated defense (i.e., the middle of the bell curve) as the algorithm presumes. Quite the opposite. He is facing a top 5 offense with his bottom 5 defense that is growing increasingly tired and ineffective. Giving the ball back to the Lions for a whole host of reasons beyond their 4th down strategy, made punting arguably a poor decision. Focus on the use case of one in front of you and not the bell curve average.
(4) The new kickoff rule is not creating more "excitement." What it has done is create more returns by moving the touchback to the 35. However, as Alfred Montapert wisely noted, "do not confuse motion with progress." Never has that advice been more apt than for the NFL's new kickoff rule.
Let's look at the numbers.
Last year, the average starting position after a kickoff was the 30-yard line. This year after the rule changes, buckets of media hoopla, and all that supposed increased return excitement, the average starting position after a kickoff is...yep, still the 30-yard line. A zero increase in EPA. But let's dig further. Last year 7 kickoffs were returned for touchdowns...an admittedly exciting play. This year? Two... a slight increase.
I'm confused...how exactly is having the same field position and essentially the same returns for TDs magically more "exciting" simply by creating more returns that are not more effective? Beyond that, the NFL's original position in changing the kickoff was to increase player safety. How is encouraging more returns and hits with no material changes in field position - motion v. progress - not needlessly increasing the risk of injuries?
If you really want to increase safety and shorten games with zero downside, just have the referees place the ball at the 30 unless there is an onside kick. If we get to the end of the season and there has been no change in starting field position versus 2024, this year will have proven the stupidity of the new Rule. Get rid of it.
(5) It seems that we are quickly moving on this podcast to viewing any punt as a "bad punt" regardless of where it is occurring - including deep in your own territory. Meaning, there is a vibe that teams - regardless of field position - should almost always "go for it" on 4th down. That suggests by implication that field position has become less important given the sizeable failure rate on 4th and long in your own territory. Yet, we somehow view surrendering 5 extra yards in your opponent’s territory on kickoffs as EPA catastrophic.
I'm OK either way with good data, but the two viewpoints are logically inconsistent. If the Ravens failed on 4th down, what would have been the EPA swing to the Lions versus them having the ball on their own 30 to assess the potential downside of going for it? That's something that was not answered here.
(6). The rules are designed to prevent a quick snap as suggested as a strategy. Referees will frequently stand over the ball to prevent a quick snap and allow the defense a reasonable period of time to substitute, get back across the line of scrimmage and get situated. This is done to maintain fair play under the rules and maintain player safety. I'm not sure that the suggested quick snap would be allowed under the rules.
(7). The "dink and dunk" style of play in recent years has been largely attributed to the so called "2-Deep Zone formation" where two safeties attempt to cover the field on deep vertical throws. However, this is likely not the cause of the problem you are seeing. It's the twisted reward system in place in the NFL.
More specifically, NFL teams are now wildly overreacting to interceptions. As noted in a prior podcast with Steve Kuhn and again here, a deep interception is often no worse than a punt and often superior to a fumble. What this suggests is that QBs and coaches are ignorantly and myopically scrutinized for "turnovers" regardless of their actual negative effect. In fact, just last night, Peyton Manning suggested a rule change to not count Hail Mary INTs against the QB for this very reason. Its as if not having turnovers is the singular goal of the offense - winning the tiresome so-called "turnover battle" - versus accumulating yards and points to win the game.
Ethan is 100% right again...you get the results that you incentivize or penalize. ("top line driving the strategy").
What we are seeing is over conservatism driven in large part by the media and some visible stats (like Passer Rating) which overweight the negative effects of any INT and underweight key passing efficiency metrics like yards per pass or Air Yards per Pass. We are now in a cycle where the QB comes to the line, identifies the defense as 2-Deep and immediately forgoes any deep pass.. he immediately surrenders...presuming it's too risky and not wanting to receive criticism. The result is dink and dunk.
This rewards the defense for doing nothing other than taking a particular position on the field pre-snap and illogically treats all safeties the same in terms of their ability to defend the pass. Meaning if you don't challenge these safeties deep, how do you know who is good at coverage and who is weak? You are presuming they are identically highly effective by challenging none of them deep. That's just not smart.
I suspect that Kuhn is right here. Soon a team will realize the need to go deep and vertically (even if incomplete) for better overall offensive efficiency regardless of the occasional INT. You need the threat of verticality to stretch defenses and increase their confusion to help your entire passing offense.
God I hate these “not gambling, gambling” episodes. The issue with framing sports talk around gambling/odds/etc is that the central character becomes the better, and the action on the field becomes secondary
Enjoyable as always. I do apologize here, but let's take my lengthy reactions in rough order:
(1) With regard to line drive kickoffs (which is presented as an innovative strategy), you cannot focus only on the cherry-picked positive outcomes, whether from YouTube or otherwise, to assess the strategy. You need to look at the net EPA differences from the strategy by also examining when the strategy fails. Otherwise, Russian Roulette would be way more exciting since if you ignore the single bullet in the chamber, the other 5 trigger pulls become a "really exciting" strategy.
This is not a theoretical or humorous exercise. In the Lions/Ravens game less than 24 hours ago, you saw this principle manifested in real time. Ravens’ kicker, Tyler Loop, missed the landing zone on one of his attempted line drive kickoffs...resulting in the Lions getting the ball at the 40 from which they scored a soul crushing - game changing - touchdown. Forget EPA, he arguably cost them the game with this stratagem.
Yet, somehow, it's worse. Loop has now missed the landing zone in each of the Ravens' first three games - a total of 4 misses overall - giving the opponent the ball at the ridiculously advantageous 40-yard line four times. Today in Baltimore, there is talk of benching Loop and his "cutting edge" kickoff strategy. Something tells me that Loop's failures won't make it to the Isaac Punts YouTube channel. Again, tell me the NET outcome of this strategy over time and not just when it works.
(2) FGs are being blocked at a higher rate, because of physics. This is not a new phenomenon, and has always been true. As the average attempted FG distance gets longer in the NFL, the kicker is required to reduce the launch angle (closer to the defensive line) to drive the ball and cover the horizontal distance over the cross bar. This is unlike shorter kicks where the kicker can pop the kick high into the air and over the defensive line. More blocks kicks is the predictable outcome here.
(3) With regard to Ethan's point about whether the Ravens should have gone for it on 4th and 9...while I don't know the answer, his analytical approach is spot on. I've talked about this in a prior post. Algorithms use average League outcome to supposedly "predict" your specific outcome. However, that's often an erroneous approach, sometimes wildly so. See, the middle of the bell curve is often very different than the case in front of you. Averages are interesting to know, but not necessarily predictive of your specific outcome.
Take last night. Harbaugh needed to understand that he is not facing the 16th rated offense with his 16th rated defense (i.e., the middle of the bell curve) as the algorithm presumes. Quite the opposite. He is facing a top 5 offense with his bottom 5 defense that is growing increasingly tired and ineffective. Giving the ball back to the Lions for a whole host of reasons beyond their 4th down strategy, made punting arguably a poor decision. Focus on the use case of one in front of you and not the bell curve average.
(4) The new kickoff rule is not creating more "excitement." What it has done is create more returns by moving the touchback to the 35. However, as Alfred Montapert wisely noted, "do not confuse motion with progress." Never has that advice been more apt than for the NFL's new kickoff rule.
Let's look at the numbers.
Last year, the average starting position after a kickoff was the 30-yard line. This year after the rule changes, buckets of media hoopla, and all that supposed increased return excitement, the average starting position after a kickoff is...yep, still the 30-yard line. A zero increase in EPA. But let's dig further. Last year 7 kickoffs were returned for touchdowns...an admittedly exciting play. This year? Two... a slight increase.
I'm confused...how exactly is having the same field position and essentially the same returns for TDs magically more "exciting" simply by creating more returns that are not more effective? Beyond that, the NFL's original position in changing the kickoff was to increase player safety. How is encouraging more returns and hits with no material changes in field position - motion v. progress - not needlessly increasing the risk of injuries?
If you really want to increase safety and shorten games with zero downside, just have the referees place the ball at the 30 unless there is an onside kick. If we get to the end of the season and there has been no change in starting field position versus 2024, this year will have proven the stupidity of the new Rule. Get rid of it.
(5) It seems that we are quickly moving on this podcast to viewing any punt as a "bad punt" regardless of where it is occurring - including deep in your own territory. Meaning, there is a vibe that teams - regardless of field position - should almost always "go for it" on 4th down. That suggests by implication that field position has become less important given the sizeable failure rate on 4th and long in your own territory. Yet, we somehow view surrendering 5 extra yards in your opponent’s territory on kickoffs as EPA catastrophic.
I'm OK either way with good data, but the two viewpoints are logically inconsistent. If the Ravens failed on 4th down, what would have been the EPA swing to the Lions versus them having the ball on their own 30 to assess the potential downside of going for it? That's something that was not answered here.
(6). The rules are designed to prevent a quick snap as suggested as a strategy. Referees will frequently stand over the ball to prevent a quick snap and allow the defense a reasonable period of time to substitute, get back across the line of scrimmage and get situated. This is done to maintain fair play under the rules and maintain player safety. I'm not sure that the suggested quick snap would be allowed under the rules.
(7). The "dink and dunk" style of play in recent years has been largely attributed to the so called "2-Deep Zone formation" where two safeties attempt to cover the field on deep vertical throws. However, this is likely not the cause of the problem you are seeing. It's the twisted reward system in place in the NFL.
More specifically, NFL teams are now wildly overreacting to interceptions. As noted in a prior podcast with Steve Kuhn and again here, a deep interception is often no worse than a punt and often superior to a fumble. What this suggests is that QBs and coaches are ignorantly and myopically scrutinized for "turnovers" regardless of their actual negative effect. In fact, just last night, Peyton Manning suggested a rule change to not count Hail Mary INTs against the QB for this very reason. Its as if not having turnovers is the singular goal of the offense - winning the tiresome so-called "turnover battle" - versus accumulating yards and points to win the game.
Ethan is 100% right again...you get the results that you incentivize or penalize. ("top line driving the strategy").
What we are seeing is over conservatism driven in large part by the media and some visible stats (like Passer Rating) which overweight the negative effects of any INT and underweight key passing efficiency metrics like yards per pass or Air Yards per Pass. We are now in a cycle where the QB comes to the line, identifies the defense as 2-Deep and immediately forgoes any deep pass.. he immediately surrenders...presuming it's too risky and not wanting to receive criticism. The result is dink and dunk.
This rewards the defense for doing nothing other than taking a particular position on the field pre-snap and illogically treats all safeties the same in terms of their ability to defend the pass. Meaning if you don't challenge these safeties deep, how do you know who is good at coverage and who is weak? You are presuming they are identically highly effective by challenging none of them deep. That's just not smart.
I suspect that Kuhn is right here. Soon a team will realize the need to go deep and vertically (even if incomplete) for better overall offensive efficiency regardless of the occasional INT. You need the threat of verticality to stretch defenses and increase their confusion to help your entire passing offense.